IS220PVIBH1A 336A4940CSP16 with terminal board

Description

The following hardware combinations are approved for use in hazardous locations:
• Mark VIe Discrete Output I/O pack IS220PDOAH1A
with terminal board IS200TRLYH2E, IS200TRLYH3E, IS200TRLYH1F, or IS200TRLYH2F
• Mark VIe Discrete Output I/O pack IS220PDOAH1B
with terminal board IS200TRLYH2E, IS200TRLYH3E, IS200TRLYH1F, IS200TRLYH2F, IS200SRLYH1A,
IS200SRLYH2A, IS400SRLYH1A, IS400SRLYH2A, IS40yWROBH1A, IS40yWROFH1A, IS40yWROGH1A or
IS40yWROHH1A
• Coated Mark VIe Discrete Output I/O pack IS221PDOAH1B with terminal board IS201TRLYH2E, IS201TRLYH3E,
IS201TRLYH1F, or IS201TRLYH2F
• Mark VIeS Safety Discrete Output I/O pack IS220YDOAS1A
with terminal board IS200TRLYS1F, IS200TRLYS2F, IS400TRLYS1F, or IS400TRLYS2F
• Mark VIeS Safety Discrete Output I/O pack ISx2yYDOAS1B (where x = 2 or 4 and y = 0 or 1)
with terminal board IS40yTRLYS1B, ISx0yTRLYS1F, ISx0yTRLYS2F, IS40yTRLYS1D, IS40ySRLYS2A,
IS40yWROBH1A, IS40yWROFH1A, IS40yWROGH1A, or IS40yWROHH1A

Controller (DPU or CPU) failure
(1) The CPU of the hiacs-5000cm control system fsss1 of a 300MW × 2 unit in a power plant failed, and the control right was not handed over, and the slave CPU failed to switch to the main control, resulting in the inoperability of some system control equipment (the equipment remained in the original state). When the main CPU is changed online to power failure, the main control CPU is switched from the cup, and the system equipment is controlled. After the original main control CPU is replaced, the system is normal.
(2) The data inconsistency between different controllers in the same PCU cabinet of Symphony produced by ABB at an early time was solved by upgrading the firmware;
(3) In the early stage of Xinhua Control XDPS system, a batch of DPUs had been offline and crashed for many times. After inspection, it was found that there was a problem with individual capacitance of DPU cards, which was resolved by upgrading and replacing cards.
At present, the controllers of DCS are in redundant configuration, which greatly reduces the number of unit trips caused by “abnormal” of the main controller. However, once a pair of redundant controllers crash at the same time, it will directly threaten safety in production. Measures must be taken to effectively avoid such situations.

DCS software problems
(1) During the DCS commissioning of a 300MW heat supply unit in a power plant, the quality parameters of the measuring points were not modified, so that the analog measuring points were considered as bad quality measuring points only when the line was disconnected, which did not fully play the function of quality verification. After that, the quality parameters of all measuring points were set, which improved the reliability of equipment operation.
(2) When the hiacs-5000cm control system screen is configured, double click the grab configuration tool, and the c++ error window pops up, which cannot be used normally. After inspection, it was found that the grab.ini file had been changed. After copying the file from another machine and overwriting it, the tool returned to normal. Because the error information is retained in the grab.ini file after grab exits abnormally.
(3) The logic of the deaerator water level control circuit in a power plant was copied and modified from the high-pressure heater water level control logic. The modification process was not thorough, and the PID parameters were not set according to the deaerator conditions, resulting in the divergent regulation of the deaerator water supply valve during operation and the deterioration of the regulation quality. Take measures: check logic and reset PID parameters.

IS220PAOCH1B
IS220PCLAH1A
IS220PCLAH1B
IS220PDIAH1A
IS220PDIIH1B
IS220PDIOH1A
IS220PDIOH1B
IS220PDOAH1A
IS220PHRAH1A
IS220PHRAH1B
IS220PPDAH1A
IS220PPRAH1A
IS220PPRAS1A
IS220PPRAS1B
IS220PPROH1A
IS220PPROS1B